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Abstract
We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax
evasion. This waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities investing costly eﬀort
in the concealment and detection of tax evasion. We show that these socially in-
eﬃcient eﬀorts - as well as the frequency of tax evasion - depend positively on the
prevailing tax rate, but not on the ﬁne which is imposed in the event of detected
tax evasion. Tax evasion is less frequent, though, than a model with risk neutral
taxpayers predicts. We ﬁnd evidence that this is due to individual moral constraints
rather than to risk aversion.
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It is not clear what the welfare implications of tax evasion are. Some authors believe
that tax evasion itself constitutes a deadweight loss for society (e.g. Usher, 1986). Some
o t h e r sp o i n to u tt h ed i ﬃculty to asses its welfare eﬀects, since the state of the economy, the
eﬃciency of the prevailing tax system, and social preferences over income distributions are
unknown (see Cowell, 1990, chp 7). In any case, tax evasion causes two additional types
of social costs: First, taxpayers invest eﬀort and money in order to conceal tax evasion.1
Second, tax authorities bear the costs of auditing in order to detect tax evasion.2 Hence, a
given tax system does not only inﬂuence the amount of tax evasion or the size of a country’s
shadow economy (Schneider and Enste, 2000); it also has immediate consequences for
the extent of wastefully invested resources in the concealment-detection contest between
taxpayers and tax authority. Tax enforcement and concealment going along with cheating
are costly not only for the individuals involved, but also for a society, since these resources
could otherwise be used for productive purposes. Consequently, this cost can be viewed
as a further excess burden of taxation a society has to bear.
In this paper, we are interested in the inﬂuence of a tax system on these wastefully invested
resources. We present a model of a concealment-detection contest between taxpayer and
tax authority. The taxpayer can invest some of his income in order to shelter his evasion
behaviour while the tax authority spends resources on detection after having observed the
taxpayer’s reported income.3 The probability that tax evasion is detected decreases with
the taxpayer’s concealment investment and increases with the authority’s detection eﬀort.4
In our model, we are able to investigate how tax rates and ﬁnes inﬂuence not only tax
1Think, for instance, of a taxpayer spending money for bribes or forgoing possible interest payments
in order to shelter black money abroad. Of course, some forms of tax evasion might actually relieve the
taxpayer of compliance costs. For instance, non-lodgment is basically tax evasion through doing nothing.
Yet, those forms of tax evasion might be less successful than those which entail substantial costs.
2Think of hiring more tax administrators to monitor tax reports or of investing in better detection
technology, which have been shown empirically to reduce tax evasion (see, for instance, Cebula, 2001).
3This sequential structure implies that our model belongs to the group of game-theoretic models of
the interaction of taxpayers and tax authorities. On overview of this group of models and a comparison
to the second dominant group in this area (the principal agent approach) is provided in Andreoni et al.
(1998).
4Uncertainty about ﬁscal parameters (like the prevailing tax rate or success of an audit) has been shown
to inﬂuence taxpayer compliance (Alm et al., 1992c). Our model also bears elements of uncertainty since
the success of an audit is uncertain. Compared to Alm et al. (1992c), for instance, we have, however, a
richer structure by explicitly modeling the (socially ineﬃcient) concealment and detection costs.
1evasion, but also the resources wastefully invested for detection and concealment. Hence,
we can determine the degree of social (in)eﬃciency of diﬀerent tax regimes. The less
resources are wasted in the contest, the more eﬃcient is the tax-collection and enforcement
system. Our theoretical model predicts that eﬃciency decreases with higher tax rates,
while the inﬂuence of ﬁnes is more complicated to predict.
Allowing for concealment and detection eﬀorts describes the tax-evasion decision more
realistically than conventional models in the tradition of Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
where taxpayers have no means of covering their evasion and audit rates are exogenously
ﬁxed. Of course, there are some papers which consider the possibility to conceal tax
evasion (like Cremer and Gahvari, 1994) or which acknowledge that investing in income-
detection technologies might raise the probability of a successful audit by the tax authority
(like Usher, 1986). However, these previous papers do not examine the extent of wastefully
invested resources in the context of tax evasion. Rather, Cremer and Gahvari (1994)
concentrate on the inﬂuence of tax evasion and concealment on the design of an optimal
linear income tax, and Usher (1986) studies the eﬀects of concealment and detection eﬀort
on the marginal costs of public funds. Therefore, our paper can be considered the ﬁrst
one to address the excess burden of tax evasion through concealment and detection costs.
Note that our model will not consider the possible repercussions of public goods provision
through taxation on tax evasion. Based on equity theory (Walster et al., 1978), one can
expect less tax evasion when taxes are used to provide public goods (see Falkinger, 1988).
However, the experimental evidence is not unambiguous on this issue (see Kim, 2002).
We, therefore, do not pursue this avenue of research, partly also because we think that
adding public good provision might confound the pure eﬀects of the tax regime on the
degree of wastefully invested resources. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that
a single taxpayer considers his tax contributions negligible for the whole amount of taxes
available for a society to provide public goods. Another avenue of research that we do
not pursue is the inclusion of diﬀerent types of information about a taxpayer, from which
the tax authority might infer the taxpayer’s audit class (Scotchmer, 1987). The latter is
deﬁned as information about the taxpayer (like his profession or age) which is correlated
with his true taxable income. In our model, the tax authority is only informed about the
taxpayer’s reported income, but not about any correlates. In reality, it is true that audit
2classes might be useful for targeting audits optimally, but to study the excess burden of
tax evasion it does not seem necessary to start with diﬀerent audit classes.
We test our model predictions in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental eco-
nomics provides an ideal methodological tool to measure the inﬂuence of diﬀerent tax
regimes on wastefully invested resources for concealment or detection of tax evasion. Ex-
perimentation in the laboratory is deﬁned by controlled manipulation of independent
treatments (inducing diﬀerent tax regimes) and randomized assignment of participants
to those treatments. If diﬀerences between experimental groups on dependent variables
(i.e., concealment and detection eﬀort) can be observed, these diﬀerences can be attributed
causally to diﬀerences in treatments (here: combinations of tax rates and ﬁnes). In the
ﬁeld, it is much more problematic to study the eﬃciency costs of tax rates and ﬁnes for
the following reasons. (1), it is hard to determine how precisely to measure concealment
and detection eﬀorts. On the side of the tax authority it might be feasible to approxi-
mate detection costs by the costs for monitoring tax declarations, whereas on the side of
the taxpayers it is less clear which kind of expenditures (legal advice, bribes, expenses,
forgone gains etc.) should be subsumed under concealment costs. (2), even if there were
consensus on how to measure the eﬃciency costs, it would be next to impossible to get
ﬁeld data from taxpayers, because expenditures associated with illegal tax evasion are
unlikely to be revealed voluntarily. (3), given that one had found a way around problem
(2), to study the comparative static eﬀects of diﬀerent tax regimes would still require the
random and controlled exposition of taxpayers and tax authorities to diﬀerent tax regimes.
This is rather problematic in reality, because ‘real-life experiments’ with tax regimes bear
problems of control, and applying diﬀerent tax rates or ﬁnes to diﬀerent taxpayers in
the same jurisdiction is legally impossible on grounds of equal treatment of taxpayers.
Of course, this is not to say that ﬁeld experiments cannot shed light, for instance, on
the inﬂuence of audit rates on tax evasion.5 Slemrod et al. (2001) report a ﬁeld exper-
iment in Minnesota on the eﬀects of an increased probability of audit on taxpayer’s tax
returns. They ﬁnd that an increased probability of audit has a positive eﬀect on declared
tax liability for low- and middle-income taxpayers, but the reverse eﬀect for high-income
taxpayers. Even though highly original in their ‘experimental’ design, one weakness of
5Taking into account reason (2) from above, it may not come as a surprise that there are no studies
yet on the inﬂuence of tax regimes on taxpayers’ concealment eﬀorts, but only on tax authorities’ eﬀorts
on tax evasion.
3Slemrod et al. (2001) is the fact that the increased probability of audit was indicated in
a letter such that a certain taxpayer “had been selected at random to be part of a study
that will increase the number of taxpayers whose 1994 individual income tax returns are
closely examined” (p. 463). The authors themselves acknowledge that there is no control
on how ﬁeld participants interpreted this loose information and how that aﬀected their
income reports. A similar problem of control in the ﬁeld is present in a recent study by
Wenzel and Taylor (2004) on the eﬀects of tax-reporting schedules on tax returns. They
ﬁnd that only a combination of both speciﬁc instructions on compliance (’education’) and
surveillance (’deterrence’) lead to less tax evasion, whereas each single component has no
eﬀect. One of the shortcomings of this study is the fact that it remains unclear how the
diﬀerently formulated letters (cooperative vs. deterring) from the Australian Taxation
Oﬃce were perceived by the rental property owners and aﬀected their tax reports.
In our experimental design, it is possible to satisfy the needs (1) through (3) discussed
a b o v ea n dh e n c ew ec a nr e l i a b l yt e s tt h ee ﬃciency-cost eﬀects of diﬀerent tax regimes,
i.e. of tax rates and ﬁnes. However, we are aware that the reliability and internal validity
of laboratory experiments come at a cost. It is less clear how results in the laboratory
can be generalized to behaviour in the ﬁeld. External validity is always an issue if labora-
tory experiments are concerned. However, due to the mentioned diﬃculties in ﬁeld data
collection in the case of tax evasion and the practical importance of assessing the excess
burden of tax evasion we believe that laboratory experiments are a legitimate method of
investigation for our question.
We ﬁnd in our experiment that higher tax rates clearly increase the size of wastefully
invested resources, whereas higher ﬁn e sd on o th a v eas i g n i ﬁcant inﬂuence on eﬃciency,
i.e. they have no systematic eﬀect on concealment and detection costs. Tax evasion itself
is also higher with higher tax rates, whereas it does not depend on the size of the ﬁne.
A further ﬁnding of our experiment is that subjects do not permanently evade taxes,
despite a design in which tax evasion is a better than fair gamble such that risk neutral
t a x p a y e r ss h o u l de v a d et a x e sa l lt h et i m e .A l me ta l .( 1 9 9 2 a )h a v ea l r e a d yp u tf o r w a r d
that the real puzzle in tax evasion is why people do pay taxes rather than why they try to
e v a d et h e m .L i k ei nt h er e a lw o r l d ,w ec a no b s e r v ei no u re x p e r i m e n tt a x p a y e r st r u t h f u l l y
revealing their income to the tax authority. A widely used explanation for this puzzle
4(see e.g. Baldry, 1987, Gordon, 1989, or Myles and Naylor, 1996) is the existence of some
psychological cost of cheating. Our model can be extended to account for such costs.
In the extension with moral costs, the theoretical model predicts that taxpayers without
any scruples always evade while taxpayers with moral constraints are at least sometimes
honest. We use this prediction in our laboratory experiment to identify whether moral
constraints really play a role in taxpayers’ evasion behaviour. We ﬁnd that the existence
of moral costs is a valid explanation for honesty, which better ﬁts the data than explaining
truthful declaration by assuming strong risk aversion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model
and derives the main predictions for the parameter settings used in the experiment. Sec-
tion 3 is devoted to our experimental results on the inﬂuence of tax rates and ﬁnes on
behavior in the detection-concealment contest. Section 4 analyzes individual behaviour
more closely and provides some interpretations for behaviour deviating from the model
predictions. A conclusion is oﬀered in Section 5.
2 Model and experimental design
In this section, we explain the timing, information, and payoﬀ structure underlying the
experiment. The experimentally implemented structure follows the theoretical model
developed in Bayer (2003). This model follows the tradition of the non-commitment tax-
evasion games initiated by Reinganum and Wilde (1986). We chose the approach where
the tax authority cannot commit beforehand to a certain audit strategy, but decides on
the audit eﬀort after receiving the tax return. The reason for this choice is our belief
that this is the more realistic case. The alternative principal-agent approach pioneered by
Border and Sobel (1987) where the tax authority can commit to an audit strategy seems
less realistic. The reasons are twofold: Firstly, the equilibria for optimal audit and ﬁne
schemes are usually somewhat unsettling as there is no tax evasion and the authority only
audits truthfully revealing taxpayers. Secondly, for these optimal audit and ﬁne schemes
to work taxpayers would have to know them and would have to believe that the authority
is committed to them. Neither are very realistic.6
6Authorities in some countries even try to keep their strategies secret as they believe that the resulting
uncertainty increases compliance (see, for instance, Alm et al., 1992c).
5The novelty of our model comes from the combination of allowing the taxpayer to invest
concealment eﬀort and the tax authority to invest into the detection of tax evasion. This
setup leads to a concealment-detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority,
where the eﬀorts exerted for concealment and detection decide over the probability that
tax evasion can be proven. This makes it possible to investigate the connection between
tax rates, ﬁnes and the frequency of evasion in a more complex environment than with
models of only one-sided investment. However, the more interesting new implication of
the model is the possibility to investigate how tax rates and ﬁnes inﬂuence the extent to
which resources are unproductively wasted in the process of tax sheltering and detection.
I nw h a tf o l l o w sw eb r i e ﬂy present the model and its equilibrium predictions for the para-
meters chosen for our experimental study. We begin with the timing.
2.1 Timing
Timing and information structure within one experimental round are the following:
1. Nature determines the actual income Y ∈ {0,y}. The probability that Y = y is
earned is given by λ. This probability is common knowledge.
2. The taxpayer observes Y.
3. The taxpayer makes an income declaration D ∈ {0,y} and exerts a concealment
eﬀort E ∈ {0,1,...,10}.
4. The authority observes the declaration D but not the concealment eﬀort E.
5. The authority chooses a detection eﬀort A ∈ {0,1,...,10}.
6. Nature decides whether the actual income is veriﬁable in court. The veriﬁcation
probability depends on the eﬀorts and is given by P(A,E), which is speciﬁed below.
7. Taxpayer and authority are informed whether a ﬁne is due. Taxpayers receive their
ex post net income U and the authority receives the revenue R, respectively. Both
players do not receive any information about the eﬀorts of their opponents.
62.2 Action spaces and payoﬀ structure
In this section we explain the underlying payoﬀ structure for the experiment and comment
on the possible actions the subjects can take.
• We restrict the income distribution to two values 0 and y. Consequently, we restrict
the possible income declaration to be dichotomous as well:
Y =
½
y with probability λ
0 with probability 1 − λ
D ∈ {0,y}
• In order to keep the experiment simple we only allow for integer values of the eﬀorts.
T h ef e a s i b l ee ﬀorts (A,E) range from 0 to 10.
• Eﬀort costs are linear for both tax authority and taxpayer. One unit of concealment
eﬀort costs the taxpayer ce experimental money units while for the authority the
detection cost per eﬀo r tu n i ti sg i v e nb yca.
• As the veriﬁcation-probability function we use:
P(A,E)=
½
1 if A,E =0
A
A+E else . (1)
This probability function is widely used in the contest literature. Combined with
linear detection and concealment costs we achieve that the marginal cost of inﬂu-
encing the veriﬁcation probability in the favoured direction increases for both the
authority and the taxpayer. This seems to be a realistic feature, since authori-
ties and tax evaders should use the cheapest means of detection and concealment
respectively, before more expensive measures are taken.
• The tax system is linear and the ﬁne is proportional to the taxes evaded. The
potential ﬁne if evasion took place can be expressed as f · t · y ,w h e r et is the tax
rate and f denotes the ﬁne parameter.
7Given this underlying structure the expected payoﬀ per round for a taxpayer depending
on his declaration behaviour and true income becomes:
EU(Y = y): =
½
(1 − t)y − ce · E for D = y
y − P(AE,E) · f · t · y − ce · E for D =0 (2)
EU(Y =0 ) : =
½
−t · y − ce · E for D = y
−ce · E for D =0 (3)
where AE denotes the expected detection eﬀort of the authority. It is immediately clear
that a taxpayer with Y =0should declare zero income. Then without evasion to conceal,
the optimal concealment eﬀort should by zero as well.
The expected payoﬀ for the authority ER can be written as:
ER(A): =
½
µ · P(A,EE) · f · t · y − ca · A for D =0
t · y − ca · A for D = y , (4)
where µ is the belief that a zero declaration comes from a taxpayer who has an actual
income of y and EE denotes the expected concealment eﬀort conditional on tax evasion
taking place. We see easily that a tax authority that observes a declaration of D = y
should not exert any detection eﬀort.
The ﬁrst-order condition for an optimal detection eﬀo r tc h o i c eo ft h ea u t h o r i t yo b s e r v i n g




µ · EE · f · t · y
(EE + A)
2 − ca =0 (5)
The ﬁrst-order condition for an evading taxpayer with respect to her concealment eﬀort
is given by
∂EU(E,D =0 ,Y = y)
∂E
=
AE · f · t · y
(E + AE)
2 − ce =0 (6)
Solving (5) and (6) simultaneously gives the optimal eﬀorts in case of:
A
∗(D =0 ) =
½
µ · f · t · y · ce · φ if D =0
0 if D = y (7)
E
∗(Y = y, D =0 )=µ · f · t · y · c





We now look for a pure strategy evasion equilibrium. In such an equilibrium a taxpayer
always evades whenever she earned the income. Then in equilibrium the authority’s belief
µ that a zero declaration comes from an evader has to be equal to the prior probability λ
t h a tt h ei n c o m ew a se a r n e d :
µ
∗ = λ.
The taxpayer’s expected payoﬀ from evasion has to be higher than the payoﬀ for truthful
declaration for such an equilibrium to exist:
EU(D =0 ,Y = y,E
∗,A
∗) ≥ (1 − t)y





Note that this equilibrium is the unique Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium for all para-
meter conﬁgurations that satisfy (9). For parameter values violating the condition above,
the marginal concealment cost and the ﬁne are too high for always evading to be prof-
itable. Taxpayers then choose to mix between evasion and truthful declaration. It can
be shown that the equilibrium evasion probability α∗ conditional on having earned the

















where η = ca/ce is the comparative advantage in concealment over detection. It is possible
to show that lower ﬁnes increase the probability of evasion for parameter settings where
evading with certainty does not pay.8 Note that here equilibrium eﬀorts A∗ and E∗
decrease if the equilibrium evasion probability α∗ decreases. This is driven by the feature
that the equilibrium beliefs for evasion µ∗ decrease if α∗ decreases. In this formulation
the tax rate should have no inﬂuence on the evasion probability.
7For the derivation see Bayer (2003).
8This is true, since ∂α∗/∂f < 0 for α∗ ∈ [0,1].
92.3 Parametrization and predictions
We set up four diﬀerent treatments by exogenously varying tax rates and ﬁnes. Tax rates
could be either 25% (Tl) or 40% (Th). Fines were proportional to the evaded tax in case
of detection, by either adding a surcharge of 25% (Fl) or of 100% (Fh) to the evaded tax.9
This was implemented by setting the ﬁne parameter f =1 .25 and f =2 , respectively.
The ﬁne - of course - also had to be paid to the tax authority. The taxpayer’s payoﬀ
per round was calculated by subtracting taxes, the ﬁne (if any) and concealment costs
from the taxpayer’s eﬀective income, which was randomly drawn in every round and could
either be 1000 Taler or zero. The probability λ for an income of 1000 was set to 0.8 for all
treatments. The marginal cost of concealment eﬀort ce was 20 Taler in all four treatments.
The marginal cost of detection eﬀort ca amounted to 40 Taler throughout the experiment.
Additionally, we awarded a base payment of 450 Taler to the tax authorities.10 This was
done in order to prevent large diﬀerences in period proﬁts of taxpayers and authorities,
in order to eliminate behavioural eﬀects stemming from inequality aversion.
We chose the parameters such that evasion, given optimal eﬀorts, always pays for risk
neutral taxpayers. Therefore, we might expect that a taxpayer always evades if his in-
come is 1000. In fact the expected declaration should always be zero. The authority’s
believed probability that a zero-declaration is fraudulent should be equal to the earnings
probability, i.e. µ∗ = λ =0 .8. Solving for the optimal eﬀort and taking the experiment’s
discontinuous action space into account gives the following prediction of optimal eﬀorts,
as summarized in Table 1:
treatment(tax/ﬁne)
optimal eﬀort of actual/observed action TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
taxpayer (E∗)- e v a s i o n 3 5 5 8
tax authority (A∗) - declare = 0 1 2 2 3
Table 1: Optimal eﬀorts for risk-neutrality
9The 25% surcharge e.g. is applied in the United States for the “failure to report or pay taxes”.
A 100% surcharge is levied in Switzerland for evasion. Some countries have even higher ﬁnes, e.g. in
Singapore a tax evader has to pay up to 400% of the evaded taxes in ﬁnes.
10Note that this does not have any impact on the equilibrium prediction.
10With these equilibrium eﬀorts we can calculate the expected eﬃciency. The expected




Then the expected eﬃciency V in percent is given by one minus the ratio of expected
waste to expected income.




This yields the predicted eﬃciency per treatment stated in Table 2. We see that higher
ﬁnes should decrease eﬃciency for given tax rates, as higher tax rates do for given ﬁnes.
treatment(tax/ﬁne)
predicted TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
eﬃciency 0.89 0.80 0.80 0.69
Table 2: Predicted eﬃciency per treatment
Note that the predicted eﬃciency levels rely on the prediction that the taxpayers always
evade. However, full evasion is only optimal if taxpayers are not too risk-averse or morally
constrained by scruples. If taxpayers do not evade with certainty then the eﬀect of higher
ﬁnes on eﬃciency is not necessarily negative. On the one hand, higher ﬁnes will increase
the agents’ incentives to exert concealment and detection eﬀorts as the “prize” for winning
the contest increases. On the other hand, higher ﬁnes will decrease the evasion frequencies
as the consequences of being caught are becoming more severe for the taxpayer. This
directly reduces waste, because concealment eﬀorts are exerted less often. Moreover,
the reduced evasion probability has a second, more indirect, waste-reducing eﬀect: The
decreased probability of evasion reduces the detection incentives - and therefore eﬀorts -
of the authority. Furthermore, anticipating the reduced detection eﬀort of the authority,
a taxpayer will reduce its eﬀort, too. Whether the total eﬀect of higher ﬁnes on eﬃciency
is positive or negative depends strongly on the strength of the deterrence eﬀect of ﬁnes if
taxpayers evade only sometimes.
113R e s u l t s
The experimental sessions were run with the help of z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999) from Jan-
uary to March 2004 at the University of Innsbruck. Two persons, called taxpayer and
tax authority were paired for 20 rounds.11 The proceedings within a period followed the
timing described above. After each round the taxpayers and authorities were informed
whether the contest had led to proven evasion. Additionally the subjects were told their
period payoﬀs. No information about the opponent’s eﬀort or payoﬀ was revealed.12 For
each treatment, we ran three sessions with 20 participants each, yielding 30 independent
o b s e r v a t i o n s( p a i r so ft a x p a y e ra n dt a xa u t h o r i t y )p e rt r e a t m e n t .T h ea v e r a g ea g eo fo u r
240 student participants was 23.2 years, with 42% being female. About 73% of partici-
pants were enrolled in business or economics, most of the others studied law, medicine or
psychology. On average, sessions lasted 45 minutes. At the end of the experiment, 1000
Talers were exchanged for 1.2 Euro. Average earnings were 12.3 Euro.
3.1 Descriptive overview
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics of the experimental data. Recall that the
actual gross income is determined by a random draw (with 80% probability for gross
income Y =1 0 0 0 , and 20% probability for Y =0 ).13 Declared income can be either 1000
or zero. If a subject gets Y = 1000, but declares zero income, he is classiﬁed as evading
the tax. The relative frequency of tax evasion ranges from 49% in treatment TlFh (with
low taxes, but a high ﬁne) to 68% in treatment ThFl (with high taxes, but a low ﬁne).
Even though it would be optimal for risk-neutral subjects to evade all the time, many
subjects mix in their decision between evasion and truthful declaration.14 On average,
11See the Appendix for a translation of the instructions.
12This information structure was chosen for reasons of comparability to reality. There the tax authority
does not ﬁnd out whether tax evasion has taken place, unless an audit is successful in detecting evasion.
We conducted some sessions where the subjects had full information about past eﬀort choices and payoﬀs
of the opponents. This alternative setting did not change the qualitative results of the present paper.
13In order to guarantee the same gross income across all treatments, we let in each round 8 out of
10 taxpayers receive an income of Y = 1000. The 8 subjects were determined by a random number,
with those 8 with the highest random number getting Y = 1000. Participants were not aware of this
procedure, but were only informed about the 80% probability for receiving Y = 1000.
14The discussion of possible reasons for truthful declaration will follow in Section 4.
12tax evasion is detected by the tax authority in about one third of cases, ranging from
31% in TlFl to 39% in ThFl. Of course, the probability of detection is dependent on the
taxpayers’ and the tax authorities’ eﬀorts for concealment and detection, which will be
discussed in detail in section 3.3 and which are summarized in Table 4 below. Taxpayers’
proﬁts are highest in treatment TlFl and lowest in treatment ThFh; the reverse holds true
for tax authorities.
treatment(tax/ﬁne)
Averages per treatment (N =3 0per treatment) TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
Relative frequency of tax evasion 0.54 0.49 0.68 0.63
Relative frequency of detected tax evasion 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.32
Proﬁt taxpayer 12159 11405 10096 9481
Proﬁt tax authority 9703 10123 9864 11281
Student of economics and business (1 = yes) (N =6 0 ) 0.70 0.77 0.77 0.67
Gender (1 = female) (N =6 0 ) 0.40 0.49 0.37 0.42
Age (N =6 0 ) 23.3 22.2 23.6 23.9
Table 3: Descriptive data
3.2 Frequency of evasion
Even though the theoretical prediction would be full evasion in any treatment, we ﬁnd
that the frequencies of evasion are well below one hundred percent in all treatments. So
we can explore how the evasion frequencies vary with tax rates and ﬁnes. Given that
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that actual evasion frequencies are sampled from
a normal distribution (p>0.4; Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test), we can apply an analysis
of variance (ANOVA) to study the main and interaction eﬀects of our two experimental
factors, the tax rate and the ﬁne. The ANOVA shows that evasion frequencies depend only
signiﬁcantly on the tax rate (p<0.01), but that the ﬁne (p>0.3)a n dt h ei n t e r a c t i o n
term (p>0.5)a r en o ts i g n i ﬁcant. In fact, looking at Table 3 shows that the evasion
frequencies are rather close to each other and insigniﬁcant when one controls for the tax
rate (54% in TlFl vs. 49% in TlFh, respectively 68% in ThFl vs. 63% in ThFh). However,
13when controlling for the size of the ﬁne, a variation in the tax rate leads to large and
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in tax evasion (54% in TlFl vs. 68% in ThFl, p<0.05; respectively
49% in TlFh vs. 63% in ThFh, p<0.1; t-tests).15
Figure 1 shows the development of tax evasion frequencies in intervals of ﬁve rounds.
Interestingly, evasion frequencies start out at almost identical levels in all treatments.
The observation that evasion frequencies are not diﬀerent for early rounds16 while for
later rounds a signiﬁcant diﬀerence can be found is striking, but not entirely surprising.
Recalling that the feedback subjects receive after each round is very limited, we may
expect that it takes some rounds until behavioural adjustments due to learning occur.17 In
fact, looking at the second half of the experiment, there is a clear separation of treatments
with respect to the frequency of tax evasion. Applying an ANOVA to rounds 11-20, we
ﬁnd again a strong main eﬀect of taxes (p<0.001), but no signiﬁcant eﬀects of the ﬁne
(p>0.1) or the interaction term (p>0.5).
Result 1 Tax rates are the main factor explaining tax evasion, whereas the size of the
ﬁne and the interaction of taxes and ﬁnes have no signiﬁcant impact.
3.3 Concealment and detection eﬀorts
3.3.1 Mean eﬀorts
Table 4 shows average eﬀorts of taxpayers in case of tax evasion and of tax authorities
when they observe a declaration of zero income. Figures in brackets refer to the ex-
post optimal eﬀorts, given the actual play of the opponent, i.e. the taxpayer’s relative
15Note that p-values refer to two-tailed tests. Given that our prior concerning the direction of the
diﬀerence is conﬁrmed, one might want to consider one sided p-values, which can be obtained by dividing
the p-values by two.
16Note that in Rounds 1-5, the evasion frequencies are amazingly close together in all treatments,
narrowly ranging from 0.59 in ThFl to 0.63 in TlFh.W e ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in any pairwise
comparison for these rounds.
17We ran some additional sessions with full information about the opponent’s eﬀort choice in the
previous round. In these sessions, separation of treatments with respect to evasion frequencies occurs
much earlier than in our incomplete information setting presented in this paper. Basically, evasion
frequencies across all 20 rounds in the full information setting mirror the evasion frequencies in the
second half of the incomplete information setting. This suggests that there is only a slow learning process

















Figure 1: Evolution of evasion frequencies
frequency of tax evasion and his average eﬀorts in case of evasion, or the tax authorities
detection eﬀorts. Note that ﬁg u r e si nb r a c k e t sa r ed i ﬀerent from the ex-ante optimal eﬀort
levels in equilibrium, as stated in Table 1 above. Comparing the ex-ante optimal eﬀort
levels for risk-neutrality in Table 1 with the ﬁgures for actual eﬀort in Table 4 shows that
actual eﬀorts are clearly higher than the ex-ante optimal ones in all treatments but ThFh.
Given that Figures in Table 1 assume full evasion with probability one and given that
actual evasion frequencies are the range from 49% to 68% (see Table 3) one can consider
actual eﬀort levels as excessively high, because eﬀorts should decrease with lower evasion
probabilities. The latter fact explains also why the ex-post optimal eﬀort levels of tax
authorities in Table 4 are lower than the ex-ante optimal ones in Table 1.
treatment(tax/ﬁne)
TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
Taxpayers’ concealment eﬀorts in case of evasion 6.88 7.23 7.98 8.01
(3.56) (5.41) (5.76) (8.21)
Tax authorities’ detection eﬀorts if D =0 4.02 4.30 5.18 4.36
(0.13) (0.52) (0.57) (2.33)
(In parentheses we report the average optimal eﬀorts given the actual play of the opponent.)
Table 4: Average eﬀorts per round
15Testing for treatment diﬀerences in taxpayers’ concealment eﬀorts in case of evasion by
an ANOVA18 we ﬁnd again only a main eﬀect of the tax rate (p<0.05), but no signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of the ﬁne (p>0.6) or the interaction term (p>0.6). That means that eﬀort
levels in case of evasion are signiﬁcantly higher in case of high tax rates and a given ﬁne
than in case of low tax rates. Variations of the ﬁne (under a given tax rate), however, do
not cause signiﬁcantly diﬀerent eﬀort levels.
The picture is similar with respect to tax authorities’ detection eﬀorts when they observe
a zero declaration. Although there is no signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect when we consider
all 20 rounds, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the tax rate (p<0.05;A N O V A )w h e n
looking only at rounds 11-20.19 Again, the ﬁne and the interaction term are insigniﬁcant.
In sum, the evidence concerning eﬀort levels supports the general thrust of our ﬁrst result
that tax rates, but not ﬁnes, are the main driving factor for behavior.
Result 2 Higher tax rates lead to higher concealment and detection eﬀorts, while ﬁnes
have no unequivocal inﬂuence.
3.3.2 Distribution of eﬀorts
Figure 2 shows on its left hand side the frequency distribution of tax authorities’ detection
eﬀorts if a declaration of zero was observed and on its right hand side taxpayers’ con-
cealment eﬀorts if they evaded the tax. We see that the distributions diﬀer considerably
between treatments with diﬀerent tax rates (between panels), but not for diﬀerent ﬁnes
(within panels). For high tax rates (see the bottom two panels of Figure 2) the relative
frequency of very high concealment and detection eﬀorts is greater than under low tax
rates (the top two panels).20
18The two null hypotheses of a normal distribution of (a) taxpayers’ concealment eﬀorts, and (b) tax
authorities’ detection eﬀorts can not be rejected (p>0.4 in both cases; Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test).
19Tax authorities’ eﬀort levels per zero declaration in rounds 11-20 are 3.17 in TlFl,3 . 6 1i nTlFh,4 . 9 3
in ThFl, and 4.17 in ThFh.
20For instance, whereas concealment eﬀorts of 10 occur in only 22% (24%) of cases in the low tax
treatment TlFl (TlFh), 42% (52%) of taxpayers choose the maximum eﬀort in the high tax treatment
ThFh (ThFl). For a statistical analysis of diﬀerences in means see the previous subsection.
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Figure 2: Distribution of concealment and detection eﬀorts
Furthermore we see that for tax authorities, exerting either no eﬀort or a very high eﬀort
seem to be focal points under the high tax-rate treatments (bottom panel on the left-hand
side). With low tax rates, however, choosing zero eﬀort is by far the most prominent choice
in about one third of cases (top panel on the left hand side). The latter is an indication
that tax authorities are relatively good in anticipating the truthfulness of the taxpayer’s
declaration under low tax rates.
Taxpayers’ eﬀort distributions are very similar for treatments with the same tax rates,
while they diﬀer considerably for diﬀerent tax rates but the same ﬁne. To back up this
observation statistically we pooled the eﬀort data over all experimental periods and ran
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. For taxpayers’ eﬀorts, the treatments with the same tax rates
were the only two pairs of empirical distributions where the null hypothesis of equal
distributions could not ber e j e c t e do nt h e5 %l e v e l( TlFl vs. TlFh p>. 2; ThFl vs. ThFh
p>. 06).21
21Authorities’ eﬀort distributions were found to be diﬀerent even for the treatments with the same tax
rates. Hence, not only the tax rate, but also the size of the ﬁne has an inﬂuence on the distribution of
their detection eﬀorts. However, recall that means of detection eﬀo r td e p e n do n l yo nt h et a x( a n do n l y
in rounds 11-20).
17Result 3 The distribution of taxpayers’ concealment eﬀorts is driven by the tax rate
rather than the magnitude of the ﬁne.
3.3.3 Correlation of eﬀorts
Finally, we examine the correlation between taxpayers’ and authorities’ eﬀorts in order to
check whether pairs unknowingly coordinate on similar eﬀort levels. This might happen -
even in the absence of information on the other’s eﬀort - because high eﬀort levels of the
other party might make the other party much more successful in detecting or concealing
tax evasion, which could only be counterbalanced by own higher eﬀorts. Likewise, low
eﬀorts of the other party (with an ensuing low probability of detecting or concealing tax
evasion) might make own high eﬀorts less necessary.
For the analysis, we consider only those cases where the taxpayer actually evades the tax.
That means we exclude all cases where the taxpayer reports his income truthfully. If real
income Y =1 0 0 0 ,t h e r ea r en oe ﬀorts because there is nothing to conceal, respectively to
detect. If real income Y =0 , the taxpayer chooses no eﬀort (which was enforced by the
computer program), but the tax authority might choose a positive eﬀort. Since the latter
eﬀort would be paired with a zero eﬀort of the taxpayer, we excluded these cases.
Across all treatments, average eﬀorts (in case of actual evasion) are signiﬁcantly positively
correlated within pairs (with correlation coeﬃcient r =0 .25; p<0.01; N =1 2 0 ). This
means that high eﬀorts of the tax authority are typically associated with high eﬀorts
of the taxpayer. The correlation is also positive in any of our treatments, but with the
exception of treatment TlFh it is not signiﬁcant due to the lower number of observations.
Result 4 Eﬀorts of authority and taxpayer are positively correlated, even though both
parties are not informed about each other’s eﬀorts.
183.4 Eﬃciency and tax revenue
3.4.1 Eﬃciency
We turn to the analysis of the eﬃciency levels in diﬀerent treatments. Here eﬃciency
refers to the amount of income that is not wasted in the detection-concealment contest.
We calculate an eﬃciency measure for every pair of subjects. This measure gives the
percentage of income created in a relationship that is not invested into wasteful detection
and concealment. Table 5 includes the average eﬃciency levels and Figure 3 shows the
distribution of eﬃciency levels in diﬀerent treatments. On average, eﬃciency is highest in
TlFl and lowest in ThFl. With respect to the distribution of eﬃciency we ﬁnd that 43%
of pairs in the low-tax low-ﬁne treatment (TlFl) achieve more than 90 percent eﬃciency,
whereas only 13% of pairs succeed in reaching such a high eﬃciency level in the high-tax
low-ﬁne treatment (ThFl). Checking for treatment eﬀects by an ANOVA22 yields again
as i g n i ﬁcant tax eﬀect (p<0.001), but no eﬀects of the ﬁne (p>0.5)o rt h ei n t e r a c t i o n
term (p>0.1).
Treatment TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
Actual eﬃciency 87.4 86.1 79.9 83.0
Table 5: Eﬃciency by treatment (in percent)
Result 5 Higher tax rates lead to lower eﬃciency, while the inﬂuence of ﬁn e si sn o t
signiﬁcant.
3.4.2 Tax revenues
It is interesting to check whether the sacriﬁce of some eﬃciency by increasing tax rates at
l e a s ti n d u c e sah i g h e rr e v e n u ef o rt h eg o v e r n m e n t .T h es u r p r i s i n ga n s w e ri st h a tt h i si s



































Figure 3: Eﬃciency levels of pairs by treatment
not necessarily true if one takes the detection eﬀort into account. Table 6 summarizes the
average revenue (summed over all 20 rounds) per pair and treatment. Higher tax rates
lead to slightly higher tax revenues, higher taxes recovered by audits, and higher revenues
from ﬁnes (controlling for ﬁne size). However, if enforcement costs of the tax authority
are taken into account, we see that they are larger than the sum of taxes recovered by
audits and ﬁnes in any treatment. This means that tax authorities suﬀer a loss from
exerting eﬀort to audit tax declarations. Ex post, tax authorities would have earned more
if they had refrained completely from auditing. Adding the ﬁrst four rows in Table 6
yields the total net revenues for tax authorities. With the exception of treatment ThFh,
total net revenues are rather similar and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the other three
treatments. In ThFh,t h e ya r ea b o u tt w oa n dah a l ft i m e sa sh i g ha si nt h eo t h e rt r e a t m e n t s
(p<0.01 in any pair wise comparison to the other treatments; t-test), indicating that
higher taxes lead to an increase of net revenue, but only when they are backed up by
high ﬁnes. If high taxes are combined with low ﬁnes, net revenues are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from net revenues with low tax rates. The ﬁnal row in Table 6 reports the costs
of raising one unit of additional revenue. If that were taken as a measure of the eﬃciency
of a tax system, the high-tax high-ﬁne treatment (ThFh) would have to be considered as
the most eﬃcient, since it costs on average one unit of money for detection to reap one
additional unit of money from recovered taxes and ﬁnes. The other three treatments do
20signiﬁcantly worse, with the highest costs of 2.4 units for detection to generate one unit of
revenue in treatment TlFl. Note that the diﬀerent aspects of eﬃciency discussed here and
in the previous subsection do not contradict each other. From the viewpoint of the tax
authority, high taxes and high ﬁnes (in ThFh) are relatively most eﬃcient (even though
the additional costs for audits match their additional revenue exactly), whereas from the
viewpoint of society they lead to the highest amount of unproductively invested resources
in ThFh. The reverse argument holds for TlFl.
Revenue (averages per pair) treatment(tax/ﬁne)
TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
(1) Tax revenue 1867 1900 2107 2560
(2) Taxes recovered by audits 667 708 1707 1293
(3) Fines 167 708 427 1293
(4) Enforcement costs −1997 −2327 −3323 −2665
Total net revenue for tax authority [
P
(1) − (4)] 704 989 918 2481
Net revenue in percent of income 7.39 .89 .32 2 .0
Costs of one unit of additional revenue [
(4)
(2)+(3)] 2.41 .61 .61 .0
Table 6: Revenues of tax authorities by treatment
Result 6 Higher taxes lead only to higher net revenue for the government if combined
with high ﬁnes.
3.5 The eﬀects of detected tax evasion
In this section, we are going to examine taxpayers’ and tax authorities’ future play after
tax evasion was detected. In principle, the detection of tax evasion in round t can have two
diﬀerent eﬀe c t so nt h et a x p a y e r ’ ss i d e .E i t h e rt h et a x p a y e rs w i t c h e st ot r u t h f u l l yr e p o r t i n g
the full income in the next round when he has income Y =1 0 0 0 , or the taxpayer sticks
t oe v a d i n gt a x e sb yd e c l a r i n gz e r oi n c ome, but changes his concealment eﬀort. The tax
authority can react to detected tax evasion by changing the detection eﬀort in the next
round when the taxpayer declares zero income.
In total, tax evasion was detected and a ﬁne had to be paid in 390 out of 1121 cases of
tax evasion. Table 7 summarizes taxpayers’ and tax authorities’ reactions to detection in
21round t.T h eﬁrst row (1) indicates the average relative frequency of truthful declaration
in the next round with Y =1 0 0 0 . The share of truthful declarations after having been
caught ranges from 33% in TlFl to 53% in ThFl, but neither an ANOVA nor any pairwise
comparison yields any signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect. Note that the frequency of truthful
declaration is in general only slightly higher than the overall compliance rates in the
treatments TlFh,T hFl, and ThFh (compare the ﬁr s tr o wi nT a b l e7w i t ht h eﬁrst row in
T a b l e3w h e r ey o uc a nc a l c u l a t et h ec o m p l i a n c er a t eb y1− evasion rate). In the treatment
TlFh the switching rate is even smaller than average compliance. This suggests that in
terms of evasion the experience of being caught has only a small deterrence eﬀect.
Relative frequency of TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
(1) truthful declaration+ 0.53 0.43 0.33 0.46
(2) increasing concealment eﬀort# 0.71 0.83 0.62 0.72
(3) increasing detection eﬀort∗ 0.21 0.16 0.27 0.31
Average absolute change in eﬀort units in case of
(4) increase of concealment eﬀort# 4.25 5.34 5.95 5.09
(5) decrease of concealment eﬀort# 3.50 6.00 5.80 3.93
(6) increase of detection eﬀort∗ 2.20 1.64 1.45 2.44
(7) decrease of detection eﬀort∗ 3.20 4.02 5.75 5.69
+ data refer to the next round with Y =1 0 0 0 .
# data refer to the next round with Y =1 0 0 0and D =0 .
∗ data refer to the next round with D =0 .
Table 7: Reaction to detection in round t
Yet, detection has a strong eﬀect on the other strategic variable of the taxpayer, his
concealment eﬀort (see row (2)). If taxpayers continue to evade taxes in round t +1
(or the next round with Y =1 0 0 0 )a f t e rd e t e c t i o ni nr o u n dt, their concealment eﬀort
increases, on average, in about 70% of cases. The relative frequency of increasing the
concealment eﬀo r ti ss i g n i ﬁcantly higher than a random draw in any treatment (p<0.05,
binomial test), but there are no signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects. Even though row (2) shows
that taxpayers increase their eﬀort in case of continuing evasion much more often than
they decrease it, rows (4) and (5) indicate that the absolute change in eﬀo r tl e v e l si sn o t
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for either increasing or decreasing eﬀort.
Strikingly, tax authorities react diﬀerently in their eﬀort choice to detection in round t.
Authorities seem to believe that past detection is a strong deterrent. This can be seen in
22two ways. First, the next time a taxpayer declares zero income (D =0 ) after detection
in round t, detection eﬀort is increased in less than one third of cases with the high tax
r a t ea n di no n l ya b o u to n eﬁfth of cases with the low tax rate (see row (3)). An ANOVA
yields a weakly signiﬁcant tax eﬀect (p<0.1). In each single treatment, the decrease
in detection eﬀort is signiﬁcantly smaller than a random draw (p<0.05,b i n o m i a lt e s t ) .
Second, tax authorities reduce their detection eﬀort by more units than they increase it in
each single treatment (see rows (6) and (7)), with a weakly signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
decrease and increase in both high-tax treatments (p<0.1; t-tests). For row (7) an
ANOVA also yields a signiﬁcant tax eﬀect (p<0.05), but no eﬀects of the ﬁne (p>0.6)
or the interaction term (p>0.6).
Result 7 After detected tax evasion, taxpayers do not switch to truthful declaration more
often than they do on average. Rather, they increase their concealment eﬀort in
order to reduce the probability of being caught. However, tax authorities reduce
their detection eﬀort in a large majority of cases when they observe the next zero
declaration.
4W h y d o p e o p l e p a y t a x e s ?
In this section we explore brieﬂy why taxpayers in the experiment did not always evade
taxes, even though this would have been proﬁtable. Since it was not the main purpose of
our experiment to address this question, there may be many diﬀerent possible explanations
our experimental design cannot discriminate between. This section gives some ex-post
interpretations, which, although plausible, should be further examined by experiments
tailored to discriminate between those and possible alternative explanations.
There are two main reasons why people would choose not to evade even if the evasion is a
better than fair gamble: risk aversion and moral constraints. Recall that a taxpayer should
always evade if his utility from being honest is smaller than the expected equilibrium
utility from evasion. To be willing to mix between truthful declaration and evasion the
following has to hold, where (C1) is for expected utility theory and (C2) is for expected
23value maximization with moral constraints, which cause some moral cost K in case of
evasion.23













∗)[Y − K] (C2)
Here Yh is the net income for truthful declaration, Y the gross income for successful eva-
sion, and Y gives the payoﬀ if evasion is detected. We see that for (C1) under risk aversion
(U0 > 0 and U00 < 0) the expected payoﬀ for evasion has to be greater than the certain
net income after truthful declaration. This directly follows from Jensens’ Inequality. The
same is true for the moral constraint condition (C2). There the expected payoﬀ from
evading has to exceed the certainty equivalent by the moral cost K. If we now compare
the payoﬀs in the experiment with the certainty equivalent we ﬁnd that on average the
taxpayers earned less than they would have if they had always declared truthfully. This is
also conﬁrmed by a statistical test. The payoﬀs for the taxpayers are signiﬁcantly smaller
than the net income after truthful declaration (p<0.05, N = 120).24 Consequently,
both hypotheses alone cannot explain that taxpayers were sometimes honest. On the
contrary, this ﬁnding even suggests that taxpayers were risk-loving. This immediately
becomes plausible if one takes the framing of the situation into account. Taxpayers earn
an income and then have to pay taxes. If taxpayers use their gross income as a reference
point the tax liability is perceived as a loss. According to Prospect Theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979) people are loss-averse. A further indication for loss-aversion are the
high eﬀorts in the experiment (compared to eﬀorts predicted under risk-neutrality). It is
possible to show that loss-aversion tends to increase eﬀorts.25
If taxpayers are loss-averse, it still remains to be explained why they frequently truthfully
reported their income. The reason why that may have been the case becomes clearer if we
look at some subjects showing the rather radical behaviour of always truthfully reporting
the income. In the experiment 2.5 percent of the taxpayers always reported their gross
income correctly. There is no utility function (not even extreme risk-aversion) that can
explain this behaviour. For an explanation we come back to moral constraints. Allowing
23A hybrid equilibrium where the taxpayer mixes between truthful revelation and evasion if he earned
the income requires that the taxpayer is indiﬀerent between evasion and non-evasion in that case.
24We calculated and used the diﬀerence between actual payoﬀ and hypothetical honesty payoﬀ for every
taxpayer over the 20 rounds for the statistical test.
25Proofs for some utility functions can be obtained from the authors.
24for moral constraints, i.e. an additional psychological cost K of non-compliance, this
behaviour can be explained. Then the honest taxpayers chose to truthfully reveal their
income because they had very high scruples.26
So a combination of loss-aversion and scruples is a plausible explanation for the behaviour
of taxpayers. Their behaviour, however, might be highly inﬂuenced by the tax authorities’
detection eﬀorts. In the low tax treatment the authorities’ behaviour is roughly consistent
with the prediction of our model. The fact that in the high tax treatments tax authorities
frequently switch from very high to very low detection eﬀorts and vice versa is a bit
puzzling. Our tentative explanation would be that the perceived intentions play a role. A
higher tax widens the payoﬀ spread for the authority between tax compliance and evasion.
Therefore the intention of an evader as perceived by the authority should be worse under
higher tax rates. So if people react to bad intentions with punishment (see Charness
and Rabin, 2002, or Falk et al., 2003) then the high eﬀorts could be explained by the
attempt to punish the taxpayer. These high eﬀorts, though, are very expensive, such that
a subject only wants to punish if it is certain enough that the opponent cheated.27
5C o n c l u s i o n
Tax evasion is a pervasive phenomenon in most countries. Besides having a negative
eﬀect of cutting the state’s budgetary scope, tax evasion may entail an excess burden
by inducing both taxpayers and tax authorities alike to invest unproductively and waste
resources in order to conceal or detect tax evasion.
Based on the model of Bayer (2003) we have experimentally tested the inﬂuence of tax
rates and ﬁnes on the size of the excess burden of tax evasion. In line with the model’s
predictions, we have found that higher tax rates lead, ceteris paribus, to an increase in the
26Note that anticipation of a very high detection eﬀort by the authority or reputation-building was not
the reason for taxpayers being truthful. The tax authorities who faced zero-declarations of permanently
honest taxpayers frequently anticipated this and repeatedly chose a detection eﬀort of zero. So a one-oﬀ
evasion would have been very proﬁtable in monetary terms.
27The tax authority’s mixing between very high and very low eﬀorts alternatively can be the result of
overconﬁdence with respect to the guess whether the taxpayer cheated or not, leading to beliefs close to
0 or 1. It is not clear however, why this should happen under high tax rates only.
25amount of wastefully invested resources. Fines, however, do not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the ineﬃciencies created by the tax collection and enforcement system. Hence, tax
rates, but not ﬁnes or the interaction of ﬁnes and taxes, are the driving force for a tax
regime’s excess burden.
Tax rates have also been shown to be the main factor for explaining the frequency of
tax evasion. Our result that higher tax rates typically lead to more evasion, while the
impact of ﬁnes is small and insigniﬁcant, is consistent with the experimental literature
(see for example Friedland et al., 1978; Baldry, 1987; Alm et al. 1992b). The econometric
evidence from ﬁeld studies on the eﬀect of taxes on evasion is less clear. Clotfelter(1983),
Christian and Gupta (1993), and Joulfaian and Rider (1996), for instance, ﬁnd a positive
relationship. However, Alm et al. (1990) and Feinstein (1991) ﬁnd the opposite. The
diﬀerent methodological approaches of measuring tax evasion in the various ﬁeld studies
might explain the partly contradictory econometric evidence. In the laboratory, it is
relatively easier and much more standardized how to measure the extent of tax evasion
and the inﬂuence of tax rates. Therefore, the consistency of experimental results might
reﬂect one of the advantages of laboratory methods in the ﬁeld of tax evasion.
There is another aspect in the tax evasion literature which has been addressed in this
paper, but where experimental and econometric ﬁeld studies have come to opposite con-
clusions. This is the deterrence eﬀect of past audits. In experimental studies usually
the experience of being audited and/or caught has a strong deterrence eﬀect for the fu-
ture, while in econometric studies hardly any deterrence eﬀect is found (see Andreoni et
al., 1998, pp. 843f. for a review of the literature concerning this point). Our design
and results oﬀer an explanation for this puzzle. In earlier experiments subjects did not
have the possibility to invest in concealment, so their only possible reaction to a detected
evasion was to keep evading or to switch to truthful declaration. Many subjects chose
the latter in order to avoid being caught again. In our experiment, as in reality, caught
evaders had two ways of avoiding future detection. Again they can report truthfully or
they can reduce the detection probability by a higher investment in concealment. Many
subjects chose the latter option. This ﬁnding seems to be able to reconcile econometric
and experimental ﬁndings on the deterrence eﬀect of past audits.
26Finally, our results have shown that subjects evade taxes considerably less often than
would be optimal for risk-neutral taxpayers. Hence, it is the puzzle already put forward
by Alm et al. (1992a), i.e. why people do pay taxes rather than why they try to evade
them. This puzzle has been accounted for in an extended model which assumes moral
constraints or scruples on the side of taxpayers. Such moral constraints may provide an
eﬀective deterrent to tax evasion. The perception of the tax system to be fair, government
spending to be eﬃcient and politicians to be men of integrity has been shown to reduce
tax evasion (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996; Torgler, 2003). The underlying
reason for this ﬁnding might be that these perceptions foster positive attitudes toward
the state and taxation, which become behaviourally relevant by increasing tax-evasion
scruples and thus reduce tax evasion.
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30Appendix - Experimental instructions
Instructions (originally in German)
We provide the instructions for the ThFh-treatment. In treatments with the low tax rate
(TlFx) the tax rate was set at 25% instead. In treatments with the low ﬁne (TxFl ), the
ﬁne consisted of the evaded tax plus an additional payment of one quarter of the evaded
tax.
Welcome to the experiment!
We kindly ask you not to talk to other participants until the end of the experiment.
In this experiment, there are two diﬀerent roles, taxpayer and tax authority.T h ee x p e r i -
m e n t a lc u r r e n c yi sd e n o t e da sT a l e r .T h ee x c h a n g er a t ei ss e ta t
1000 Taler = 1.2 Euro.
One taxpayer and one tax authority will be paired for the whole experiment, i.e. there
are ﬁxed pairs. The experiment consists of 21 identical rounds. The ﬁrst one of these will
be a trial round which will not be paid.
A. Sequence of events in each round
At the start of each round there is a random draw on the taxpayer’s income in this round.
With a probability of 80% the taxpayer receives 1000 Talers as income. With a probability
of 20% the taxpayer’s income is zero.
The taxpayer gets informed about his income (either 0 or 1000 Taler) and has to decide
whether or not to declare his income to the tax authority (either 0 or 1000 Taler). Further-
more, the taxpayer has to decide on a concealment eﬀort (ranging from 0 to 10 points).
31Positive concealment eﬀort causes costs, which will be speciﬁed below. The higher the
chosen concealment eﬀo r t ,t h el e s sl i k e l yi tb e c o m e st h a tt h et a xa u t h o r i t yw i l lb ea b l et o
verify the taxpayer’s real income.
The tax authority learns about the taxpayer’s declared income. Note that the tax author-
ity gets no information about the real income of the taxpayer, nor about the taxpayer’s
concealment eﬀort. The tax authority has to choose a detection eﬀort (ranging from 0 to
10 points). Positive detection eﬀort is costly. The higher the chosen detection eﬀort, the
more likely the tax authority will be able to verify the taxpayer’s real income.
The combination of concealment eﬀort and detection eﬀort determines the probability
of verifying the taxpayer’s real income, as will be explained in detail below. Given this
probability, a random draw will determine whether the taxpayer’s real income will be
veriﬁed or not.
After each round both the taxpayer and the tax authority will be informed about whether
the real income could be veriﬁed by the tax authority, but not about the other’s eﬀort
level.
B. Payoﬀsp e rr o u n d
1. Taxpayer’s payoﬀ
payoﬀ = real income - taxes - potential ﬁne - costs of concealment eﬀort
• Taxes: Declared income * tax rate: The tax rate equals 40%.
• Fine: The taxpayer has to pay a ﬁne in case he/she has declared zero income
although real income is 1000 Talers, and if the tax authority was able to verify the
real income. The ﬁne consists of the evaded tax (= real income * tax rate = 400
Taler) plus an additional payment of equal size (= 400 Taler). Hence, the potential
ﬁne amounts in total to 800 Taler.
• Costs of concealment eﬀort:
32Concealment eﬀort (points) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Costs (in Taler) 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
2. Tax authority’s payoﬀ
payoﬀ = basic wage + taxes + potential ﬁne - costs of detection eﬀort
• Basic wage: 450 Taler
• Taxes: Declared income * Tax rate (40%)
• Fine: If the real income is veriﬁed and the taxpayer declared less than his/her real
income, the tax authority receives the ﬁne of 800 Taler (for the composition of the
ﬁne see above).
• Costs of detection eﬀort:
Detection eﬀort (points) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Costs (in Taler) 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400
C. The probability of detection
The following table shows, how the combination of concealment eﬀort and detection eﬀort
determines the probability of verifying the real income. Figures in the table denote
percentages.
Detection eﬀort
Points 0123456789 1 0
Concealment 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
eﬀort 1 0 50 67 75 80 83 86 88 89 90 91
2 0 33 50 60 67 71 75 78 80 82 83
3 0 25 40 50 57 63 67 70 73 75 77
4 0 20 33 43 50 56 60 64 67 69 71
5 0 17 29 38 44 50 55 58 62 64 67
6 0 14 25 33 40 45 50 54 57 60 63
7 0 13 22 30 36 42 46 50 53 56 59
8 0 11 20 27 33 38 43 47 50 53 56
9 0 10 18 25 31 36 40 44 47 50 53
10 0 9 17 23 29 33 38 41 44 47 50
33Example: If the tax authority chooses a detection eﬀort of 7 points and the taxpayer a
concealment eﬀort of 2 points, then the detection probability is 78%. Imagine an urn
with 100 balls, numbered consecutively from 1 to 100. If in a random draw a ball with
a number from 1 to 78 is drawn, then the real income is veriﬁed and known to the tax
authority. If a ball with a number from 79 to 100 is drawn, the taxpayer’s real income
remains concealed.
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